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Comment and 
Discussion
Glenn D. Rudebusch: This paper by David Backus and Jonathan Wright
examines a timely topic of interest to macroeconomists, ﬁnancial econo-
mists, and the general public of long-term savers and investors. They
investigate the recent episode of continuing low long-term interest rates—
a behavior that appears to some to be a “conundrum” given that short-term
rates worldwide have been rising. For example, in the United States, while
the Federal Reserve raised the federal funds rate from 1 percent in June
2004 to 5
1⁄4 percent in December 2006, the rate on ten-year U.S. Treasury
notes actually edged down, on balance, from 4.7 percent to 4.6 percent.
This directional divergence between short- and long-term rates is at odds
with historical precedent and appears even more unusual given other eco-
nomic developments at the time, such as a solid economic expansion, a
falling unemployment rate, rising energy prices, and a deteriorating federal
ﬁscal situation, all of which have been associated in the past with higher
long-term interest rates rather than lower.
Of course, determining whether recent long-term interest rate move-
ments truly represent a puzzle requires a theoretical framework that takes
into account the various factors that affect long-term rates. The paper takes
a joint macro-ﬁnance perspective on this problem, which, as much recent
research suggests,
1 is a promising strategy that can capture two broad sets
of determinants of long-term rates. In particular, from a macroeconomic
perspective, the short-term interest rate is a policy instrument under the
direct control of the central bank, which adjusts that rate to achieve its
macroeconomic stabilization goals. Therefore financial market partici-
pants’ understanding of central bank behavior, along with their views of
1. See, for example, Diebold, Piazzesi, and Rudebusch (2005).
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the future direction of the economy, will be an important element in form-
ing their expectations of future short-term rates, which, in turn, will be key
in pricing longer-term bonds. For example, the widespread view over the
past few years that the Federal Reserve had inflation pretty well in hand
has undoubtedly helped hold down long-term bond rates. In addition, a
finance perspective, which stresses the importance for bond pricing of
investor perceptions of risk, is also likely to be a crucial element in assess-
ing whether there is any bond rate conundrum. Indeed, many have sug-
gested that a reduction in the risk premium is responsible for recent low
bond rates. Such a reduction may be attributable to changes in the amount
of risk or to changes in the pricing of that risk, and numerous factors have
been suggested that could have induced such changes.
The paper identifies a declining term premium, and in particular a
declining inﬂation risk premium, as the proximate source of the recent fall
in long-term interest rates. This seems reasonable, but in some sense one
can interpret the authors’ analysis as showing that there has been no
conundrum. The estimated term structure models in the paper seem to ﬁt
the recent episode as well as the earlier sample (their figures 9 and 10);
that is, the recent episode is not so puzzling that it requires a shift in
model coefficients or produces unusually large residuals. The analysis in
the paper has essentially deﬁned the “conundrum” away. Of course, such a
conclusion would require that the authors had the correct model of interest
rates and the term premium, which is far from certain. It seems useful to
examine other term structure representations in order to evaluate the
robustness of the authors’ conclusions; therefore my figure 1 plots five
different measures, taken from the literature, of the term premium in the
zero-coupon nominal ten-year U.S. Treasury yield:
2
—VAR measure: This is obtained from a standard, three-variable,
macroeconomic vector autoregression (VAR), comprising four lags each
of the unemployment rate, quarterly inﬂation in the consumer price index,
and the three-month Treasury bill rate. This VAR can be used in each
quarter to forecast the short-term rate over the next ten years, which,
after averaging, provides one estimate of the risk-neutral ten-year rate.
The difference between the observed ten-year rate and that risk-neutral
rate provides an estimate of the term premium.
2. These measures are described in detail in Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2007).
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—Bernanke-Reinhart-Sack measure: A potential shortcoming of using
a VAR to estimate the term premium is that it does not impose consistency
between the yield curve at a given point in time and the VAR’s projected
time path of yields over time. Such pricing consistency is imposed in the
model of Ben Bernanke, Vincent Reinhart, and Brian Sack (BRS),
3 which
attaches a no-arbitrage model of the term structure to a VAR and provides
an estimate of the term premium.
—Rudebusch-Wu measure: No-arbitrage restrictions can also be
imposed on top of a New Keynesian macroeconomic model, as in the
model of Rudebusch and Tao Wu (RW),
4 which provides another estimate
of the term premium.
—Kim-Wright measure: Don Kim and Wright estimate the term pre-
mium using a standard, no-arbitrage, dynamic latent factor model from
ﬁnance (with no macroeconomic structure underlying the factors).
5 In mod-
els of this kind, risk-neutral yields and the term premium are determined
3. Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004).
4. Rudebusch and Wu (2007, forthcoming).
5. Kim and Wright (2005).
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Figure 1. Five Estimates of the Ten-Year Term Premium, 1984–2005
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yield data. This measure is the closest to the versions considered in the
present paper.
—Cochrane-Piazzesi measure: John Cochrane and Monika Piazzesi
analyze one-year-holding-period excess returns for a range of Treasury
securities.
6 Their primary ﬁnding is that a single factor—a particular com-
bination of current forward rates—predicts a considerable portion of these
excess returns for Treasury securities. These, in turn, together with the
one-year risk-free rate, imply an expected set of zero-coupon yields one
year ahead (since the only way to generate expected returns on zero-
coupon securities is through changes in yield). By iterating forward, one
can compute the expected excess return for each of the next ten years,
thereby yielding a measure of the term premium on the ten-year security.
All ﬁve of these measures of the term premium show declines over the
past few years and are generally consistent with the conclusions of Backus
and Wright. However, these various measures also illustrate the consider-
able uncertainty that should be attached to any measure of the term pre-
mium. This caveat is worthy of elaboration; therefore I next consider in
detail the implications of the results of the BRS and RW models for the
recent behavior of long-term rates.
7
My ﬁgure 2 shows the ten-year zero-coupon U.S. Treasury yield from
1984 through 2006 together with the BRS model decomposition of that
yield. The risk-neutral rate implied by the BRS model is the model’s esti-
mated yield on a riskless ten-year zero-coupon bond, the implied ten-
year Treasury yield is the model’s estimated yield on the same bond
after accounting for risk, and the implied term premium is the difference
between the two. The BRS model does not match the data perfectly, and so
the model’s residuals—the difference between the model predictions tak-
ing into account risk and the data—are graphed in ﬁgure 3. Despite the
model’s excellent ﬁt to the data overall, the recent period of low ten-year
yields is one episode that the model notably fails to fit. From mid-2004
through the end of 2006, the model overestimates the ten-year Treasury
yield by around 50 basis points on average. Figures 4 and 5 present the
analogous pair of graphs for the ten-year bond yield decomposition
implied by the RW model. Again the ﬁt of the model to the data is excel-
320 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
6. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005).
7. This discussion is based on the analysis of Rudebusch, Swanson, and Wu (2006).
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Figure 2. Decomposition of the Ten-Year Treasury Yield, 1984–2006: Bernanke-
Reinhart-Sack Model
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Figure 3. Unexplained Portion of the Ten-Year Treasury Yield, 1984–2006:
Bernanke-Reinhart-Sack Model
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Figure 4. Decomposition of the Ten-Year Treasury Yield, 1988–2006: Rudebusch-Wu
Model
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Figure 5. Unexplained Portion of the Ten-Year Treasury Yield, 1988–2006:
Rudebusch-Wu Model
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lent, which is all the more remarkable given that the RW model was not
optimized to fit the ten-year yield at all (indeed, the five-year yield is the
longest maturity used in the estimation, and the estimation sample ends
in 2000).
The two models’ implied decompositions into the expected short-
term rate and the term premium are very different. In the RW model the
term premium is relatively constant over 1988–2006, hovering around the
2 percent level, with little high-frequency variation but a notable cyclical
movement. Furthermore, the RW model attributes most of the variation
in the ten-year yield over time to changes in the expected future path of
short-term rates. By contrast, the BRS model attributes most of the high-
frequency variation in the ten-year yield to changes in the term premium
component, with the risk-neutral component generally trending smoothly
downward. The differences between the estimates of the ten-year term pre-
mium in these two models largely reﬂect different assumptions about the
long-run persistence of movements in the nominal short-term rate. The
BRS model is based on estimates of a macroeconomic VAR that is speci-
ﬁed in levels. The smoothly downward-trending risk-neutral rate from the
BRS model is essentially a VAR projection of the future path of the short-
term rate that reverts to its sample mean fairly quickly. In the RW model
the future path of short-term interest rates is instead affected greatly by
highly persistent changes in the perceived value of the central bank’s target
for inﬂation, which allows signiﬁcant variation in the risk-neutral ten-year
yield. Obviously, then, estimates of the ten-year term premium are very
sensitive to assumptions about the long-run properties of the short-term
rate.
8 However, such long-run properties are difﬁcult to determine,9 and so,
once such speciﬁcation uncertainty is accounted for, the conﬁdence inter-
vals associated with any term premium estimate are quite substantial.
Still, despite their differences, the BRS and RW models are largely in
agreement that there is, in fact, a conundrum. Speciﬁcally, the recent level
of long-term bond yields is substantially lower, on the order of 30 to 80
basis points, than can be explained by either of these models. Of course,
documenting the conundrum, especially as a sequence of large residuals of
the same sign, is only one step toward explaining it. Rudebusch, Eric
Swanson, and Wu examined several popular explanations for the conun-
8. Kozicki and Tinsley (2001).
9. Rudebusch (1993).
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drum by regressing the BRS and RW macro-ﬁnance models’ residuals on
various proxies for uncertainty or volatility, and they found that most of
the conundrum remained unexplained.
10 Backus and Wright have to take
a somewhat different strategy because their ﬁnance yield-curve represen-
tations are so flexible that the residuals in fitting yields are apparently
minuscule. Therefore they employ a two-step strategy, regressing an
estimate of the term premium on macroeconomic variables, and it is only
in this ﬁnal regression that a bond yield conundrum can be said to emerge.
Speciﬁcally, the large recent residuals from their second-stage regression,
which are apparent in their ﬁgure 11, suggest that if the authors have the
correct term structure model, then the conundrum is an unusually low term
premium relative to macroeconomic fundamentals.
It is important to stress that even if the explanatory power of these
second-stage regressions had been higher, we are still some distance
away from a model that integrates the various explanations of recent low
long-term rates into an underlying asset pricing model. Only such a uniﬁed
10. Rudebusch, Swanson, and Wu (2006).
Figure 6. S&P 500 Volatility Index (VIX) and Ten-Year Term Premium, 2007
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one-step formulation can provide a complete and compelling accounting
of the recent episode. To give some sense of how much we do not under-
stand, ﬁgure 6 plots daily data on the Kim-Wright term premium along
with the VIX measure of implied volatility from options on the S&P 500
index as a measure of uncertainty in the stock market. Backus and Wright
note that the decline in the VIX measure of financial market risk is
broadly consistent with the fall in the term premium. Unfortunately, as
the daily data show, this correlation does not always hold. On February 27
of this year, when ﬁnancial markets were shaken by surprising news on
durable goods orders and drops in Chinese equity prices, the implied
volatility jumped, but the term premium fell. Of course, one could spec-
ulate that although ﬁnancial risk had clearly risen, the price attached to
that risk fell even more as funds ﬂowed into the bond market in a “ﬂight to
quality.” However, such speculation shows that much remains unknown
about movements in the term premium and in bond rates more generally.
General discussion: Benjamin Friedman called attention to the decompo-
sition, in the authors’ ﬁgure 10, of the nominal forward rate into expected
inﬂation and an inﬂation risk premium as well as the expected future real
interest rate and a real term premium. He found it striking that the estimate
of expected inflation had gone up rather than down with the advent of
the present Federal Reserve chairman, noting that it was inconsistent with
the common explanation of the long-term yield conundrum, namely, that
market participants ﬁnd credible the assurances that inﬂation is going to
remain in check over the long term. The rise in expected long-run inﬂation
should be particularly surprising to those economists who believe that an
explicit inflation target should keep inflation expectations in check. To
Friedman this evidence, which suggests that market participants are not
convinced that inflation will remain low, made the current low level of
nominal long-term rates even more puzzling.
Gregory Mankiw remarked that the paper did not so much crack the
forward rate conundrum as recharacterize it as a term premium conun-
drum. He suggested that the next step is to explain the behavior of such
premiums. He also suggested that if they are to be interpreted as risk pre-
miums, they should be related to some measure of risk. He reminded the
panel of a Brookings paper he had presented twenty-one years ago, in
which he had tried but failed to ﬁnd a relationship between term premiums
and the risks captured in second moments.
10657-05b_Backus Comment.qxd  8/15/07  10:15 AM  Page 325326 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
Mankiw was also surprised by the authors’ finding of an empirical
relationship between forward rates and dispersion in expectations. He cau-
tioned against interpreting this as evidence of a risk premium, noting that
dispersion is a measure of disagreement, not a measure of uncertainty.
For example, all would agree that the expected outcome of a roll of dice
is seven even though the actual outcome is quite uncertain, ranging from
two to twelve. Disagreement must have something to do with varying
information sets or different interpretations of similar information. Unfor-
tunately, economics lacks good models of disagreement.
Richard Cooper regarded the label “term premium” as misleading and
drew parallels to the panel’s discussion of the paper by Oliner, Sichel, and
Stiroh in this volume, where some had criticized what they saw as the
reiﬁcation of the productivity residual. The label “term premium” simply
denotes the unexplained residual from the estimation and should be
referred to as such.
Eswar Prasad suggested looking at asset markets other than the market
for U.S. Treasury securities to learn about the importance of Asian cen-
tral banks’ behavior in holding down long-term rates. He noted that the
Chinese authorities are putting similar amounts of money into agency
bonds, such as Ginnie Maes, as into Treasury bonds. Although there is
no good measure of term premiums for agency bonds, Prasad believed it
could be informative to compare the behavior of those markets with that
of the Treasury market. He observed further that if one assumes U.S. and
foreign industrial bonds to be close substitutes, any future announcement
of a revaluation of China’s currency should have had effects on those
markets as well. An asymmetric response of term premiums on U.S. and
foreign bond markets to the announcement that the Chinese central bank
intends to diversify away from dollars into other currencies would pro-
vide further evidence of the importance of foreign bank behavior to U.S.
interest rates.
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